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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On October 20, 2006, after a three-day bench trial, the trial court entered a final 
order setting aside a Quitclaim Deed and thereby revoking Eugene and Zelma B. Davis' 
partial revocation and modification of their revocable trust (the "Trust") by the 
conveyance of certain real property to Russell Young. R. at 760-761. On November 
13, 2006, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the above order. R. at 761-
763. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, 
this Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Questions Presented and Standard of Review 
1. Did the Trial Court err by ruling that the Quitclaim Deed, which 
conveyed the Farm to Russell Young, was invalid because it was not supported by 
fair consideration? 
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for 
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no 
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp, v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference 
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant 
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filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2. Did the trial court err by ruling that the trustees and grantors/settlors 
(Eugene and Zelma), did not have power to convey the Farm out of the Trust 
without consideration? 
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for 
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no 
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference 
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Quitclaim deed was not 
effective to amend or revoke the Trust in conveying the Farm to Russell Young? 
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for 
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no 
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference 
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because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding that Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 
does not control the modification/revocation of the Trust because it is not to be 
applied retroactively? 
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for 
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 
861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no 
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference 
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
5. Did the trial court err in ruling that Eugene did not have authority to 
execute the Quitclaim Deed and transfer the Farm on behalf of the Trust without 
the signature of Zelma as the co-trustee? 
The standard of review is de novo. Legal conclusions should be "reviewed for 
legal correctness." Morse v. Packer, 973 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1999); State v. Deli, 
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861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) ("We accord the trial court's conclusions of law no 
deference but instead review them for correctness."); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e afford no deference 
because they are conclusions of law and are therefore reviewed for correctness."). 
This issue was preserved for appeal because the order was a final order and Appellant 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal regarding the same. R. at 761-763. Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from the trial court's misinterpretation and erroneous 
application of controlling law. Defendant/appellant Russell Young ("Appellant") is the 
grandson of the Decedents Eugene and Zelma Davis. Plaintiff/appellee Steven R. 
Davis is the son of Eugene and Zelma Davis, the uncle of Appellant, and the 
current/successor Trustee of the revocable Trust created by Eugene and Zelma 
("Davis"). 
On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma Davis each executed a Last Will and 
Testament. (Trial Exhibits 4 and 7; addendum Exhibits A and B) (hereinafter referred 
to as Exhibits A and B). On the same date, they joined in creating a revocable trust 
called the Eugene Davis and Zelma B. Davis Family Living Trust ("Trust"). (Trial 
Exhibit 10; addendum Exhibit C) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit C). The Trust 
provides that it may be revoked "in whole or in part", under Article 2.01 subsection (a) 
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as follows: "While either grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument may be 
revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by grantors or the survivor of 
them, and delivered to the trustees." Article 2.01 (c) of the Trust sets forth the scope 
of grantors' powers as follows: 
The powers reserved by grantors under this article 2.01 are exercisable in 
the absolute discretion of grantors and, excepting conditions of mental 
incapacity, mental incapacity being established by written certification of 
mental incapacity by two physicians who are not beneficiaries and are not 
spouses, children or siblings of beneficiaries of this trust), neither the 
trustees nor any beneficiaries hereunder shall have any right or power to 
enforce or object to the exercise of such powers. (Emphasis added.) 
In addition to the absolute and discretionary right of revocation of the Trust in 
whole or in part, the Trust also provides for distribution of income and principal in 
Article 2.02 as follows: 
While either grantor is living, the trustee shall hold, manage, invest, and 
reinvest the trust estate, collect the income therefrom and pay the 
grantors, or the survivor of them, all, none, or such part of the net 
income and principle of the trust estate as the grantors may determine to 
be necessary for the medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable 
comfort in their accustomed manner of living. 
On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelmas each executed a Durable Power of 
Attorney, granting to one another broad reciprocal power "to do and perform all and 
every act that [he or she] may lawfully do through an attorney in fact, and every power 
necessary to carry out the purposes for which the power is granted with full power of 
substitution and revocation, hereby satisfying and affirming that which [his or her] 
substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done by [him or her]. Substitute carefully 
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designated by virtue of the power herein conferred upon [him or her]." (Trial Exhibits 
6 and 9; addendum Exhibits D and E) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibits D and E). 
On September 5, 1997, Eugene and Zelma amended their estate by a codicil 
which declared their intent to leave Russell Young $5,000 from their estate. (Trial 
Exhibit 13; addendum Exhibit F) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit F). On July 11, 
2000, Eugene and Zelma each executed an identical codicil to their Wills. The codicils 
had the effect of devising to Russell Young one fourth of the remaining residuary estate 
after payment of some small sums to other grandchildren. (Trial Exhibits 5 and 8; 
addendum Exhibits G and H) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibits G and H). Pursuant to 
the Codicils, the other three fourths of the residuary estate were devised to Eugene and 
Zelma's children. 
On January 1, 2001, Eugene executed a Quitclaim Deed conveying a parcel of 
real property known as the farm ("Farm") to Russell Young. (Trial Exhibit 15; 
addendum Exhibit I) (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit I). The Quitclaim Deed 
provides for conveyance of the Farm by "Eugene and Zelma B. Davis Trustees" as 
grantor to Russell Young as grantee. Eugene's signature on the Quitclaim Deed was 
notarized on the same date, but the Quitclaim Deed was not recorded at that time. TR 
at 443. On March 21, 2003, after Eugene passed away, Zelma affixed her signature to 
the Quitclaim Deed and had her signature notarized. TR at 217. The Quitclaim Deed 
was recorded on March 24, 2003. At the time that Zelma Davis signed the Quitclaim 
Deed, Eugene Davis was deceased and Zelma Davis was the sole grantor, trustee, and 
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beneficiary under the revocable trust. Eugene Davis died on March 12, 2003 and 
Zelma Davis died on October 16, 2005. There has never been a certification of 
incompetency by two physicians for either grantor, nor was there an adjudication of 
incompetency prior to the trial court's ruling on October 26, 2006, a year after Zelma's 
death. 
This action was filed by Davis as successor Trustee to invalidate the transfer of 
the Farm to Russell Young and otherwise determine the proper disposition of the Farm. 
The trial court misinterpreted and refused to apply the correct law as to the 
effect of the Quitclaim Deed in partially revoking the Trust and conveying the Farm to 
Russell Young. Additionally, the trial court refused and failed to analyze and apply 
Utah statutory law and give meaning to the clear intent of Eugene and Zelma Davis in 
granting the Farm to Russell Young. 
B. Court Proceedings and Disposition 
The trial of this matter was conducted over a three day period in the Eighth 
Judicial District Court in Duchesne County, Utah in front of Judge A. Lynn Payne. On 
October 20, 2006, following a three-day bench trial and a bench ruling, the trial court 
entered a final order setting aside the Quitclaim Deed and thereby invalidating Eugene 
and Zelma B. Davis's partial revocation of their Trust by the conveyance of the Farm 
to Russell Young. R. at 760-761. On November 13, 2006, Appellant filed a timely 
notice of appeal from the above order. R. at 761-763. 
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C. Material Facts 
1. On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma each created a Last Will and 
Testament that were identical in their essential terms. (Exhibits A and B). 
2. On the same date, Eugene and Zelma joined in creating the revocable 
Trust. (Exhibit C). 
3. The Trust provides that it may be revoked, in whole or in part, while 
either grantor (Eugene or Zelma) is living "by and instrument signed by grantors or the 
survivor of them, and delivered to the trustees." (Exhibit C, Article 2.01(a)). 
4. The Trust does not, by its terms, make the method for revocation set forth 
in Article 2.01(a) exclusive, nor does it prohibit other methods of revocation. (Exhibit 
C, § 2.01(a)). 
5. The Trust reserves to the Trustees a wide scope of powers, to be 
exercised in the "absolute discretion of grantors" and prohibits the beneficiaries of the 
Trust from enforcing or objecting to the grantors' exercise of such powers. (Exhibit C, 
§ 2.01(c)). 
6. Also on October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma each executed a Durable 
Power of Attorney ("Power of Attorney"). The Power of Attorney executed by each of 
the grantors granted broad discretionary power to the other to perform any and all acts 
which either one could lawfully perform, including specifically the right to revoke the 
Trust. (Exhibits D and E). 
7. On September 5, 1997, Eugene and Zelma amended their estate by each 
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executing a handwritten codicil to their Last Wills and Testaments, which amended the 
estate, by leaving $5,000.00 to Russell Young. (Exhibit F). 
8. On July 11, 2000, Eugene and Zelma each executed an identical codicil to 
the Last Will and Testament which had the effect of dividing the "remaining residuary 
estate" by percentages among their three children and their grandson Russell Young, 
with each receiving one fourth (1/4) of the residuary estate. (Exhibits G and H). 
9. Since the time of his boyhood, Russell Young had been raised by his 
grandparents, Eugene and Zelma (TR at 396-398), and had worked closely with Eugene 
in caring for, improving and managing the Farm. (TR at 398-403). Russell had 
contributed much labor to the Farm and loved to work it with his grandfather. Id. 
10. On January 1, 2001, Eugene executed the Quitclaim Deed conveying the 
Farm to his grandson, Russell Young, as grantee. (Exhibit I). 
11. The Quitclaim Deed identifies Eugene and Zelma B. Davis Trustees as the 
grantor and Russell Young as grantee. Eugene's is the only signature for the grantors 
on the Quitclaim Deed. His signature was notarized on the same date it was executed, 
January 1, 2001. (TR at 617-618) (Exhibit I). 
12. At or about the date he executed the Quitclaim Deed, Eugene delivered 
the same to Russell Young. (TR at 443). 
13. Eugene passed away on March 12, 2003. (TR at 843). 
14. Shortly after Eugene's death, Zelma communicated her desire to sign the 
Quitclaim Deed and have it recorded. (TR at 453). 
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15. On March 21, 2003, Zelma signed the Quitclaim Deed before Coralee 
Sanchez, a Notary Public. (TR at 453-456). (Exhibit I). 
16. On March 12, 2003, the Quitclaim Deed was recorded. (Exhibit I). 
17. Zelma Davis died on October 16, 2005. (TR at 174). 
18. Zelma's mental health and capacity had been failing since approximately 
1994. (TRat859). 
19. The trial court found that Zelma was not mentally competent at the time 
she executed the Quitclaim Deed, and had not been mentally competent for an 
indeterminate period prior thereto. (TR at 859-860). 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Effect of the Quitclaim Deed 
The trial court refused to apply the correct law as to the effect of Eugene's 
conveyance of the Farm to Russell Young. The trial court ignored or refused to 
recognize that under Utah law, the conveyance of trust assets out of a trust operates as 
a partial revocation as to that portion. Further, the court erred in holding that Eugene 
had not substantially complied with a method provided in the terms of the Trust for 
revocation. Lastly, the court failed or refused to recognize that Eugene and Zelma 
Davis manifested clear and convincing evidence of their intent to revoke the Trust with 
respect to the Farm when they conveyed such to Russell Young. 
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Eugene had Authority to Act Alone and on Behalf of Zelma in Revoking the Trust 
The trial court failed or refused to apply the correct law to the facts of the case 
when it held that, pursuant to Utah law, Eugene did not have authority to partially 
revoke the Trust alone and on behalf of his wife, Zelma. Further, the court erred in 
failing to recognize and hold that under the terms of the Trust, Zelma failed to act as 
trustee and, therefore, Eugene was granted authority to act alone in revoking the Trust. 
Lastly, the court erred when it held that the Power of Attorney was ineffective to grant 
Eugene the authority to act and sign for Zelma in partially revoking the Trust. By its 
error, the court refused to recognize and hold that under Utah law, a durable power of 
attorney may grant an agent the authority to revoke a trust. The court confused the 
issue, misread and misconstrued the Power of Attorney, and failed to apply the correct 
law to the facts and documents of the case. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THE QUITCLAIM DEED WAS 
INEFFECTIVE TO PARTIALLY REVOKE THE EUGENE AND ZELMA 
B. DAVIS LIVING TRUST AND CONVEY THE FARM TO RUSSELL 
YOUNG. 
1. The Utah Uniform Trust Code, § 75-7-101 et seq., Enacted in 20049 
Applies Retroactively and Therefore is the Controlling Law With 
Respect to the Trust. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3), of the Utah Uniform Trust Code ("Trust 
Code"), sets forth various methods by which a settlor may revoke or amend a 
revocable trust. These methods are: (1) by substantially complying with a method 
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provided in the terms of the trust; or (2) if the terms of the trust do not provide a 
method or the method provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by (a) 
specifically devising property that would otherwise have passed according to the terms 
of the trust; or (b) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the 
settlor's intent. These methods are in addition to any method provided for under the 
applicable trust instrument. 
The Trust Code made certain changes to the then existing common law and the 
prior legislative provisions with respect to requiring strict adherence to certain 
formalities in revoking and amending trust instruments. The Trust Code clearly 
reflects the legislature's intent to liberalize and give more effect to the settlor's intent 
pertaining to revocation and amendment. See Uniform Law Comments to U.C.A. 
§ 75-7-605. 
While acknowledging that a different result may have been determined under 
§ 75-7-605, the trial court ruled that § 75-7-605 was not the controlling law governing 
its decision because it was enacted in 2004 and therefore did not apply to the Trust, 
which was created in 1993. TR at 827-830; 833. However, the trial court's ruling was 
in error because it failed to recognize that the Trust Code was intended to be and was 
expressly made retroactive and as such it should have controlled the court's analysis 
concerning the Trust. 
It is a general principle of law that the legislature, by explicit or implicit 
language, can make a law retroactive. To determine whether or not the 2004 Trust 
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Code is retroactive in its effect, it is instructive to review the law generally with respect 
to the retroactivity of statutes. In Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998), the Court stated: 
. . .a legislative enactment which alters the substantive law . . . will not 
be read to operate retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly 
expressed that intention. The intent to have the statute operate 
retroactively may be indicated by explicit statements that the statute 
should be applied retroactively or by clear and unavoidable implication 
that the statute operates on events already past. 
citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988). 
Therefore, with the general law in mind, and turning to the present matter, 
under the Utah Uniform Trust Code § 75-7-1103(l)(a), (Application to Existing 
Relationships), the Utah legislature expressly stated: "[ejxcept as otherwise provided, 
this chapter [the Utah Uniform Trust Code] applies to: all trusts created before, on, or 
after July 1, 2004." (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, as the Utah legislature has specifically provided that the Utah 
Uniform Trust Code is to be applied retroactively, it is the controlling law governing 
all matters of interpretation regarding the Trust. 
a. The Execution of the Quitclaim Deed Substantially Complied 
with the Terms of the Trust for Revocation. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3), a settlor effectively revokes a trust if he 
substantially complies with a method provided in the terms of the trust. Black's Law 
Dictionary equates the term "substantial compliance" with the "substantial performance 
test", and defines it as follows: 
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The rule that if a good-faith attempt to perform does not precisely 
meet the terms of an agreement or statutory requirement, the 
performance will still be considered complete if the essential 
purpose is accomplished. 
Black's Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999). 
At § 2.01(a), the Trust provides as follows: 
While either grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument 
may be revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by 
Grantors, or the survivor of them, and delivered to the Trustees. 
Although the Trust does not make exclusive the means whereby the Trust may 
be revoked, the Trust does expressly provide one method whereby the settlors, or one 
of them, may effectuate a partial or complete revocation of the Trust. To substantially 
comply with the method provided in the Trust, one or both of the settlors must sign an 
"instrument". According to Black's Law Dictionary, the term "instrument" is defined 
A written document; a formal or legal document in writing, such as 
a contract, deed, will, bond or lease . . . Anything reduced to 
writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing 
given as a means of affording evidence. A document or writing 
which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the 
purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right. 
A writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or 
agreement. 
Black's Law Dictionary, (5th ed., West 1979). (Emphasis added). 
i. The Quitclaim Deed Constitutes an "Instrument55 Within 
the Meaning of Article 2.01(a) of the Trust. 
Under the above definition, it is clear that the term "instrument" encompasses 
14 
deeds. A deed is a formal written document which gives expression to a legal act or 
agreement. A deed can create, secure or terminate a right. The plain language of 
§ 2.01(a) of the Trust provides that a proper method to revoke the Trust is to sign an 
"instrument." It is also clear the Trust does not mandate that this instrument refer to 
the Trust or state that it is revoking the Trust - it need only have the effect of partial or 
complete revocation. Clearly, a deed fits the definition of an "instrument" and thereby 
comports with the method provided for in the Trust. 
Although the Quitclaim Deed does not state explicitly that it is revoking the 
Trust in whole or in part, it is consistent with prevailing law that when a settlor has 
retained the power to revoke a trust, and subsequently withdraws or deeds a portion of 
the property out of the trust, the settlor has partially revoked the trust as to that portion. 
See Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) § 330, Comment n (ordinarily a power to 
revoke the trust will be interpreted as including a power to revoke the trust in part by 
withdrawing a part of the trust property from the trust); see also Waldron v. Commerce 
Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Tenn. 1978) (where court found that a settlor 
sufficiently manifested her intention to revoke her trust - despite not using explicit 
language of revocation - when she informed a bank trust officer that she wanted funds 
transferred from her trust to her checking account whenever her checking account 
balance ran low); Enoch v. Enoch, 2006 WL 1006648 *5 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (where 
the settlor indicated another use for a specific asset conveyed in his trust, such 
indication demonstrated the settlor's intent to modify or revoke the original trust 
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agreement); Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 WL 563311 (Utah App. 2006) (where the court 
held that conveying property out of the trust partially revoked the trust as to that 
property even though revoking instrument did not refer to the trust or state that it was 
revoking the trust). 
Consequently, Eugene, acting pursuant to the power which was vested in him as 
settlor and trustee, legally effectuated a partial revocation of the Trust by signing an 
instrument (the Quitclaim Deed) which conveyed assets out of the Trust to Russell 
Young. 
ii. The Settlors Were Not Required to Deliver the Revoking 
Instrument to Themselves as Trustees. 
The Trust also states that after the settlors/grantors have signed the instrument or 
deed, the settlors/grantors are to deliver the signed instrument to the trustees. Trust § 
2.01(a). As pointed out earlier, Eugene and Zelma were the settlors/grantors and were 
also the sole Trustees. As such, by the act of executing the deed, the settlor(s) 
effectuated a delivery of the same to themselves as Trustees. To require a formalized 
second delivery to themselves is not realistic and is inconsistent with the intent and 
purpose of the delivery requirement for revoking the Trust. The purpose of requiring 
settlors to deliver a copy of the revoking instrument to the trustees is for the trustees' 
protection, which the trustees may therefore waive. See 90. C.J.S. Trusts § 115 
(2002); U.C.A. § 75-7-605(7). 
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revoke the trust by any method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of their 
intent. Utah case law is consistent with the principle that "the power [to revoke] may 
be exercised by any method which sufficiently manifests [Grantor's] intention to modify 
[or revoke] the trust." In re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 594 (Utah 2003); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Section 331. 
In 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals, in Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 WL 563311 
(Utah App. 2006), addressed a strikingly similar case in which the settlor/trustee of a 
revocable trust conveyed two parcels of real property out of the trust. The trial court 
held that upon conveying the property out of the trust, the settlor/trustee's act of 
conveyance revoked the trust with regard to those two parcels of property. Id all. In 
affirming, the Court of Appeals stated: 
It is undisputed that Bronn created a revocable trust. Accordingly, where 
no specific method of revocation is required, she may revoke the trust in 
any method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of her intent. 
Where Bronn sold the property of the trust and deposited it into three 
subsequent personal accounts without designating herself as trustee or the 
funds as trust funds, the trial court properly found that she revoked the 
trust respecting that property . . . the conveyance itself is an implied 
revocation of the trust, since the trustee and the beneficiary are divested 
of all interest in the property. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 
Additionally, the court in Boulton held that it was immaterial that the revoking 
instrument did not specifically state that such would operate as a revocation. Further, 
the court held that the trust was revoked even though the settlor/trustee signed the sale 
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documents as trustee. The court stated that it was totally appropriate to sign as trustee 
to assure the legal validity of the conveyance. Id at 2. 
Here, the factual situation is nearly identical. Eugene signed and delivered the 
Quitclaim Deed conveying the property out of the trust. He did not designate that the 
conveyance was done for the benefit of the trust; rather, he conveyed the property with 
little or no consideration thereby evincing his intent to revoke the Trust as to that 
property. He also signed as trustee in order to ensure that the conveyance was legally 
valid and binding on the Trust and because, at the time, the Trust held legal title to the 
property. As such, the conveyance of the Farm, through the Quitclaim Deed, 
manifested by clear and convincing evidence the intent of Eugene and Zelma to revoke 
the Trust as to the Farm. 
2. As the Conveyance of the Farm Was Effective in Partially Revoking 
the Trust, No Consideration was Necessary for the Quitclaim Deed to 
Revoke or Convey the Farm to Russell Young. 
A revocable trust is defined as: "[a] trust in which the settlor reserves the right 
to terminate the trust and recover the trust property and any undistributed income." 
Black's Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999). Furthermore, a "settlor may 
grant powers to administer or appoint or withdraw trust property, during or after the 
settlor's lifetime, to others who may be trustees or beneficiaries, or persons otherwise 
unconnected with the trust, or may hold powers alone or jointly in fiduciary or 
nonfiduciary capacities." Restatement (Third) of Trusts, § 25 (2003). 
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The trial court erroneously ruled that the settlors could not deed the Farm out of 
the Trust because the Quitclaim Deed was not supported by fair consideration. TR at 
832, 834-835. However, as stated above, the court erred in failing to recognize that 
the deeding of a portion of the Trust assets out of the Trust operates as a partial 
revocation as to that portion. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) § 330, 
Comment n; Waldron at 675; Enoch at 5; Boulton at 1-2; 90. C.J.S. Trusts § 115 
(2002). However, and notwithstanding the trial court's error, the Trust was effectively 
revoked as to the Farm and therefore, upon revocation, the Trust neither owned the 
Farm nor did the stated purpose for the Trust control over the disposition of the Farm 
or any proceeds derived therefrom. 
The court based its analysis and found support for its finding that the Quitclaim 
Deed failed for lack of consideration by referring to the stated purpose of the trust, 
which was for the upkeep and maintenance of Eugene and Zelma during their lifetime. 
Trust § 2.02, TR at 832. However, the court ignored or failed to recognize that by 
retaining full power over the assets and by retaining the authority to revoke the trust at 
any time and by any means, manifesting clear intent, once a valid revocation of the 
trust has occurred, the purpose of the Trust no longer controls the disposition of the 
property. Since one of the established means for revoking a trust is to convey by deed 
or otherwise withdraw a portion of the property out of the trust, once that property is 
taken out of the trust, and the trust is partially revoked, the trust provisions and purpose 
are no longer controlling over the revoked property and, therefore, consideration is not 
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required for a valid conveyance. 
The trial court erred, misinterpreted and misapplied the law by not finding that 
Eugene's withdrawal and deeding of the Farm to Russell validly revoked the trust as to 
the Farm and, therefore, no consideration was necessary because the disposition of the 
Farm was not controlled by the Trust after the partial revocation. 
B. EUGENE DAVIS HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT ALONE IN PARTIALLY 
REVOKING THE TRUST AND GRANTING THE FARM TO RUSSELL 
YOUNG. 
Under the terms of the Trust, the controlling law and relevant facts of the 
record, Eugene Davis had the authority to both revoke the Trust and to grant the Farm 
to Russell for and on behalf of himself and Zelma Davis, as settlors and trustees. 
1. The Utah Uniform Trust Code § 75-7-605(2) Allows Either Spouse to 
Revoke the Trust. 
Under Utah Uniform Trust Code § 75-7-605(2), "[i]f a revocable trust is created 
by more than one settlor, to the extent the trust consists of community property, the 
trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone. . ." Id. "Community Property" is 
defined as: 
Assets owned in common by husband and wife as a result of its having 
been acquired during the marriage by means other than an inheritance or a 
gift to one spouse, each spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the 
property. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, (8th ed., Thompson-West 1999). 
California courts have had opportunity to interpret a similar statute regarding 
revocation of trusts by one spouse as to community property. Under California Family 
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Code § 761(b), "[u]nless the trust instrument provides otherwise, a power to revoke as 
to community property may be exercised by either spouse acting alone." This statutory 
language is nearly identical with Utah's Code § 75-7-605(2). Further, in interpreting 
California's law as to revocation by one spouse, the Third District California Court of 
Appeals held: "revocation of a joint trust by one spouse is effective as to all community 
property in the trust." In Re Estate of Powell 100 Cal.Rptr. 2d 501, 505 (Cal. App. 3 
Dist. 2000). 
Here, the Farm, before being conveyed to the Trust in 1993, was jointly owned 
by Eugene and Zelma B. Davis. (Trial Exhibit 12; addendum Exhibit J). Therefore, 
as the Trust property at issue consisted of community property, Eugene had the 
authority under Utah law to act alone in revoking the Trust. 
2. Under the Terms of the Trust, Zelma, as Co-Trustee, Failed to Serve, 
Thereby Allowing Gene to Act Alone. 
Under § 3.01 of the Trust (Substitute Trustee): "If either of the above named 
trustees [Gene and Zelma Davis] fail or cease to serve for any reasons, the other may 
serve alone." The trust further states that only if both of the original trustees, Gene 
and Zelma, fail or cease to serve, are substitute trustees appointed. Id. However, if 
only one of the trustees, Eugene or Zelma, fail or cease to serve, then the other may act 
alone. Id. 
The Court heard testimony and specifically found that since 1994, Zelma Davis's 
mental condition had deteriorated. TR at 859. In support of the Court's finding, the 
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Court referenced Dr. Ripplinger's testimony and patient examination notes indicating 
Zelma's mental health was significantly in decline. Id. Further, at least as early as 
2001, Eugene expressed concerns to Zelma's physician regarding Zelma's mental 
condition. Specifically, Eugene expressed concern about Zelma's flashes of anger and 
her inability to make financial or other personal decisions. TR at 147. Not only did 
Eugene have serious concerns but Zelma herself informed her physician that she felt 
"she was slowly losing her mind." TR at 148. 
Based on the trial court's findings that Zelma's mental health was in decline 
from 1994, and based on the testimony of Dr. Ripplinger that Zelma and Eugene 
expressed serious concerns with Zelma's ability to make financial and personal 
decisions in 2001, it is apparent the trial court found Zelma was in no condition to 
function as co-trustee of the Trust prior to 2001. 
As such, in early 2001, Gene Davis, in an effort to carry out his and Zelma's 
well established intent of leaving the Farm to Russell (TR at 77, 95, 101, 103, 202, 
225-226, 237, 372, 376, 379, 383-385, 393, 407, 443, 453, 537-538, 546-548, 579), 
prepared, signed, notarized and delivered the Quitclaim Deed to Russell. TR at 443. 
As Eugene had serious concerns regarding Zelma's mental health which had caused her 
to fail to serve as co-trustee, and pursuant to § 3.01 of the Trust, Gene lawfully acted 
alone in partially revoking the trust and deeding the Farm to Russell. 
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3. Eugene and Zelma Davis Executed Durable Powers of Attorney 
Granting Each the Authority to Act for the Other to Revoke the Trust 
The trial court erroneously ruled that the Power of Attorney was ineffective to 
grant Eugene the authority to act and sign for Zelma in partially revoking the Trust. 
TR at 836-837. However, the court confused the issue, misread and misconstrued the 
Power of Attorney, and failed to apply the correct law to the testimony and documents 
offered in the case. 
Although Utah law permits either spouse to act alone in revoking a jointly 
created revocable trust, and although Eugene had authority granted unto him to act 
alone pursuant to § 3.01 of the Trust, Eugene and Zelma Davis went a step further in 
manifesting their intent that either one, acting alone, could bind the Trust and each 
other. They executed durable powers of attorney granting each other full power to act 
in the behalf of each other to take any lawful act that the individual could take, 
including specifically the power of revocation. 
On October 27, 1993, Zelma Davis executed the Power of Attorney, naming her 
husband, Eugene Davis, as attorney in fact: 
I, Zelma B. Davis, of Dechesne, Utah hereby make, constitute, and 
appoint Eugene Davis, my true and lawful attorney in fact for me and in 
my name, place, and stead, giving unto him full power to do and perform 
all and every act that I may lawfully do through an attorney in fact, and 
every proper power necessary to carry out the purpose for which the 
power is granted, with full power of substitution and revocation, hereby 
ratifying and affirming that which his substitute shall lawfully do or cause 
to be done by him or his substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the 
power herein conferred upon him. If he should fail or cease to serve for 
any reason, I appoint Steven R. Davis, and Patricia Ann Zufelt, acting 
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jointly, to serve in his stead. This power shall not be affected by 
disability of myself, either physical or mental. 
Durable Power of Attorney for Zelma Davis, Exhibit E. (Emphasis added). 
Although the Power of Attorney is unlimited as to its scope and purpose, it is 
instructive to read the document in the context of the Trust, since it was executed on 
the same day the Trust was executed and as part of the same estate plan. From the 
plain and unambiguous language of the document, it is clear that Zelma granted to her 
husband, Eugene, the fall power to act in her stead for ah purposes, including the 
expressly granted power to revoke the Trust. Further, at the trial of this matter, the 
evidence established through Stanley Morrell (preparer of the Trust documents), that 
both Eugene and Zelma were instructed and fully understood that under the durable 
powers of attorney they both had the authority to sign and bind each other on legal 
documents. TR at 110-113. 
The Power of Attorney grants broad and unlimited power to Eugene to act for 
Zelma and includes express reference to Eugene's power of revocation. Under such 
circumstances, courts have held that a general durable power of attorney grants an 
agent the authority to revoke a trust, especially where the agent is given broad powers 
over the principal's affairs. This is true even though the power of attorney does not 
specifically grant the power to revoke the trust. In re Schlagel Trust, 51 P.3d 1094, 
1094 (Colo App 2002). See also First Union National Bank of Virginia v. Thomas, 
1995 WL 1055807, at 3-4 (Vir. Cir. Ct. 1995) (court held that agent had authority to 
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revoke a principal's trust, where power of attorney granted such power); In re 
Mosteller, 719 A.2d 1067 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1998) (Power of attorney included power to 
revoke living trust, even without specific grant, given its broad general grant of power 
and its specific language allowing attorneys-in-fact to deal with trusts). 
In the Schlagel case, the court, in holding that the power of attorney granted 
authority to revoke the trust, looked to the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
the power of attorney. Specifically, the court pointed to the fact that at the same time 
the wife executed the power of attorney, both the husband and wife created the trust at 
issue. Schlagel at 1096. Further, the court pointed to the fact that the power of 
attorney specifically included the granting of "full power of revocation." Id. 
The circumstances pertinent to this issue are all identical in this case. Here, the 
durable power of attorney is clear in granting Eugene authority to act in all matters on 
behalf of Zelma. The power of attorney gives very broad and expansive authority to 
Eugene to act in Zelma's stead. Further, the power of attorney was signed in the 
context of executing the trust thereby evincing an intent that the power of attorney was 
meant to be exercised in connection with trust matters. Lastly, the power of attorney 
includes the specific language granting "full power of substitution and revocation." 
Exhibit E. 
Therefore, as the Durable Power of Attorney specifically grants Eugene "full 
power of revocation", and as the Power of Attorney was executed in connection with 
the other Trust documents, according to Utah law and case law throughout the country, 
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Eugene had full authorization to revoke the Trust for and on behalf of himself and his 
wife. 
a. By Executing the Quitclaim Deed for and On Behalf of the 
Trust, Eugene Properly Acted for Himself and as Attorney 
in Fact for Zelma. 
The trial court erroneoulsy ruled that Eugene did not act as attorney in fact for 
Zelma when he signed the Quitclaim Deed. TR at 836. The court ruled that if Eugene 
was intending to act as Zelma's attorney in fact he would have had to sign the deed 
twice. The court cites no law in support of its ruling. Further, the court refused to 
acknowledge or analyze the effect of Eugene's preparation of the Quitclaim Deed had 
on the effectiveness of the same for Eugene and Zelma Davis as Trustees and Grantors. 
In preparing the Quitclaim Deed, Eugene set forth Zelma's and his name as 
trustees and grantors, and then signed his name as acting for both him and Zelma. As 
he was vested with "full power of revocation" under the Power of Attorney, he had 
authority to act on Zelma's behalf to partially revoke the Trust as to the Farm property. 
Courts have addressed similar situations regarding agents' signatures under 
durable powers of attorney and the various effects of such in binding their principals. 
In Kahn v. Royal Banks of Missouri, 790 S.W.2d 503 (Miss. Ct. App. 1990), the court 
was presented with the question of the binding effect of a promissory note on a wife 
and husband where the husband signed such on behalf of himself and his wife under a 
durable power of attorney granted to him by his wife. The court concluded the wife 
was bound even though the husband did not indicate he was signing in his 
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representative capacity under the durable power of attorney. The court, in explaining 
the binding effect of the husband's signature in light of a new durable power of attorney 
statute in Missouri, stated: 
The obvious purpose of the new statutory requirement that agents always 
reveal their representative capacity is to let third parties know with whom 
they are dealing. This purpose is served whenever a principal's name 
appears on an instrument, even if an agent has signed . . . without 
revealing the agent's representative capacity. . . [A] principal whose name 
has been affixed to a commercial paper by an authorized agent is 
personally liable on that instrument . . . 
Id. at 510. 
It is instructive to look at relevant Utah law with respect to the effect of an 
agent's signature in binding the principal when the agent does not state he is signing in a 
representative capacity. Under U.C.A. § 70A-3-402 of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code, Negotiable Instruments, "if the form of the [agent's] signature does not show 
unambiguously that the signature is made in a representative capacity or the represented 
person is not identified in the instrument, the representative is liable on the instrument." 
U.C.A. § 70A-3-402(2)(b) (emphasis added). Although this law has specific reference 
to transactions governed by the UCC, it is relevant to gain an understanding of the 
policy principles surrounding principal-agent relationships. 
Here, Eugene prepared the Quitclaim Deed and properly identified himself and 
Zelma as trustees and as grantors of the property under the Trust. As such, he 
identified the person being represented and thereby gave notice to all third parties that 
he was representing Zelma in his representative capacity. Kahn at 510. Then, after 
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identifying the principals (himself and Zelma) he signed his name to the Quitclaim 
Deed. As such, it is evident that he intended to demonstrate that he was acting on 
behalf of himself and Zelma, as trustees and grantors, to partially revoke the Trust and 
deed the Farm to Russell Young. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based on the above arguments, Appellant Russell Young respectfully 
requests that this Court: (1) reverse the trial court's order that the conveyance of the 
Farm to Russell Young by the Quitclaim Deed did not partially revoke the Trust as to 
the Farm, (2) reverse the trial court's order that the Quitclaim Deed is void ab initio, 
(3) order that the Quitclaim Deed was effective to partially revoke the Trust and convey 
the Farm to Russell Young, and (4) remand the case for entry of a new judgment 
quieting title to the Farm in Russell Young. 
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